



YOUTH PARLIAMENT- SUDAN

Official Framework Document | For Executive Circulation and Strategic Partners

Conflict, Interventions, and Political Transformation in Sudan

The Strategic Outlook of the Youth Parliament (September 2026 – September 2028)

2 / 18 Sovereign Divide Two de-facto authorities (Port Sudan / Nyala), 18 conflict-affected states and 3 major attrition axes.	8 Negotiation Rounds Jeddah (1 & 2), the secret Manama track, Geneva (ALPS), and IGAD / neighbouring-state facilitation.	19.5M Acute Food Insecurity 41% of the population at risk, 13.3M displaced/refugees, 135K+ in catastrophic famine.	5 Projected Scenarios Entrenched partition, truce & transition, army empowerment, disintegration & chaos, regional escalation.	5K Members in Digital Registry Institutionalizing 18 state-level parliaments; framing 24 policy and rights-research papers.
--	--	--	--	---

Prepared By	Issue Date & Version	Nature and Use of the Document
Prepared by: Munzer Mustafa – Secretary-General of the Sudan Youth Parliament.	30 August 2026 Version 1.0 – Executive September (2026–2028)	A strategic reference addressed to international organizations, civil society, and funding partners of transition and transitional-justice processes.

Disclaimer

This paper is an independent research and framework document prepared for analytical and strategic-foresight purposes. It does not necessarily represent an official position or institutional decision of the Youth Parliament- Sudan, its Secretariat, or any of its committees. The views, assessments, and conclusions reflect the perspective and qualitative sources used in its preparation, and are subject to review and updating as circumstances evolve. This document does not constitute a mandate or a declaration of official Parliament policy and may not be construed as binding on the institution or its members. Contributions from interviews and qualitative input were included for analytical purposes only and do not constitute personal positions attributed to participants, nor official positions of the Parliament.

Introduction

We place this paper before you as a collective effort to understand Sudan as it is today—not as we wish it to be—and to consider what the country may face during the 2026–2028 period, and what this may mean for the **Youth Parliament – Sudan** in its second term.

We wrote this paper because, after more than three years of war, the Sudanese crisis can no longer be understood simply as a temporary emergency awaiting a military outcome or a political agreement. The nature of the conflict has changed; centers of power have multiplied; the roles of key actors have shifted; external involvement has expanded; and the humanitarian cost has deepened. At the same time, new forms of community organization, resilience, resistance, and survival have emerged. Against this backdrop, we began with a fundamental question: **What has actually changed? Where might our country be heading? And where can the Youth Parliament play a meaningful role in this context?** The paper is based on an analytical assessment of the key trends and drivers of the conflict, alongside an examination of military, political, humanitarian, and regional developments; an analysis of key actors and centers of power; and an assessment of the Parliament’s institutional environment. We then used scenario analysis to explore possible trajectories for Sudan during 2026–2028. We also drew on **guided interviews and qualitative contributions from members of the elected General Secretariat of the Youth Parliament – Sudan during the 2024–2026 term, as well as a number of candidates for the General Secretariat and committees for the second term, 2026–2028**. These consultations explored accumulated institutional experience, interpretations of current developments, key challenges and opportunities, and perspectives on the Parliament’s future role.

We did not treat these interviews as a statistical survey, nor did we regard the views expressed as definitive facts. Rather, we treated them as **qualitative knowledge, experience, and informed assessments** contributing to the analytical process. Nor do we claim that this paper captures the full complexity of Sudan or offers a single explanation of its trajectory. It is, above all, an attempt to develop a shared analysis that remains open to discussion, challenge, and revision as circumstances evolve.

The purpose of the paper, therefore, is to move from **understanding the present to thinking through strategic choices**: What scenarios might Sudan face? What risks should be anticipated and prepared for? What opportunities might emerge even in the most difficult environments? And, most importantly, what kind of institution does Sudanese youth need at this stage, and what role can the **Youth Parliament** realistically, independently, and effectively play?

This paper is therefore **a starting point for dialogue**. We hope it will be read as a space for disagreement, critical reflection, and reconsideration, and that it will contribute to building a more realistic strategy for the Youth Parliament during its second term—one that is better equipped to engage with a changing Sudan and a future that remains open to multiple possibilities.

This paper also carries particular significance because of its publication on **30 August, the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances**. Although enforced disappearance is not addressed as a standalone theme in this paper, the choice of this date represents a moment of remembrance and respect for the victims and their families, and for all those who have been forcibly disappeared amid the war and violations in Sudan. Behind the figures, analysis, and scenarios are human beings whose fate remains unknown, and families still waiting for truth and justice. Publishing this paper on this day is therefore a reminder that any discussion of peace, political transition, and Sudan’s future must not overlook the rights of victims to **truth, justice, clarification of their fate, and remembrance**.

Munzer Mustafa - 30 August 2026

Table of Contents

No.	Topic	Page
A	Cover Page	1
B	Foreword	
C	Table of Contents	
1	Sudan at a Crossroads	
2	Executive Summary	
3	The Battlefield Situation and Military Balance	
4	International and Regional Actors	
5	The Architecture of Mediation and the Political Process	
6	Map of Local Constituencies and Stakeholders	
7	The Humanitarian Situation and Baseline	
8	Scenarios for the Next 24 Months	
9	The Strategic Framework for the “Second Electoral Term”	
10	References and Sources	

1| Sudan at a Crossroads:

- The country has entered its fourth year of a full-scale war that erupted in mid-April 2023. The conflict has moved beyond the traditional pattern of armed confrontation between a regular and a paramilitary force, turning instead into a compound structural crisis that has redrawn the country's political, demographic and social geography. The duration of the conflict has produced a state of de-facto partition, embodied in the emergence of two parallel authorities performing state-like roles, amid a complete paralysis of service and development sectors and the near-total collapse of the social fabric and cohesive governance institutions.
- Within this complex context, there is an urgent need to reassess the tools of civic action and their capacity to impose new realities on the war-and-peace equation. Traditional forms of civic expression and approaches limited to reporting on the war and its horrors are no longer sufficient to respond to the scale of the challenges on the ground and the political deadlock forcibly imposed by the parties to the conflict. It is from here that this framework paper — addressed to the second electoral term of the “Youth Parliament - Sudan” (September 2026 – September 2028) — sets out an evidence-based strategic reading of the state of the conflict, and offers a scenario-grounded outlook, with the aims of maximizing public-policy production, monitoring civic space, and directly influencing peace arrangements and political transition.
- The paper's methodology rests on an analysis of the main trends and drivers of the political landscape, together with a precise assessment of the Youth Parliament's institutional baseline as of August 2026. It seeks to present an integrated vision that balances the urgent humanitarian and field response led by youth, women's and grassroots networks on the ground, with politically and diplomatically informed influence attentive to regional and international interventions.

2| Executive Summary:

- **The Reality of the Conflict and the Field Balance:**
 - **Institutional and sovereign division:** More than three years of fighting have produced a de-facto partition of Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces retain control of Khartoum, the Nile Valley, and the eastern states, holding on to international legitimacy and the central institutions from Port Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces and their allies, meanwhile, control most of the Darfur region and parts of Kordofan and Blue Nile, running their own institutions from Nyala through a parallel “Founding Alliance (Tasis)”.
 - **The nature of combat and attrition tactics:** The conflict has turned into a war of drones and attrition against urban centres. Although the army has achieved logistical progress in Kordofan and recovered vital roads, aerial bombardment and the siege of major cities (such as El Obeid and Omdurman) keep civilians under constant threat.
 - **Atrocities and accountability:** Reports from the UN Fact-Finding Mission, whose investigators published findings in July 2026, documented that atrocities committed in Darfur by the Rapid Support Forces — particularly around the fall of El Fasher in October 2025 — rise to the level of genocide, prompting escalating international action and targeted sanctions against gold-trade networks and the financing of war networks.
- **Assessment of Mediation and External Interventions:**
 - **Competing peace tracks:** Mediation efforts suffer from paralysis due to the split between two main tracks: the Quadrilateral track (the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE), which focuses on a humanitarian truce and ceasefire through direct engagement with the two

- military parties, and the Quintet track (the African Union, IGAD, the Arab League, the European Union, the United Nations), which calls for a comprehensive civilian dialogue leading to a transitional government free of armed factions and “extremist groups.”
- **The internal-dialogue offer:** The commander of the Armed Forces (al-Burhan) exploited this split by putting forward a unilateral offer for an internal “Sudanese-Sudanese” dialogue overseen by the security apparatus in Port Sudan and Khartoum — which several civilian forces viewed as an attempt to contain the political track.
 - **External leverage:** The UAE remains the most sensitive driver and supplier behind support for the Rapid Support Forces via cross-border supply lines, while Washington and Riyadh represent the main sources of pressure that have not yet fully activated their tools to impose a mandatory truce.
 - **The Humanitarian Catastrophe and Baseline:**
 - **Food insecurity and famine:** 19.5 million people (41% of the population) face acute food insecurity, and more than 135,000 people have entered catastrophe/famine conditions (IPC Phase 5), with the figure projected to rise to 200,000 by the end of the dry season, and warnings of worsening famine in 14 besieged areas.
 - **The world's largest displacement crisis:** The number of internally displaced people has exceeded 8.9 million, in addition to 4.4 million who have fled abroad, amid the collapse of 40% of health facilities and the near-total disruption of education.
 - **Scenarios for 2026–2028:**
 - **Entrenched de-facto partition:** Continuation of two parallel authorities and frozen front lines, with the parallel state in Nyala and Port Sudan becoming institutionalised.
 - **A negotiated truce and a contested transition:** The parties yield to Quad pressure and agree on a humanitarian truce followed by a civilian political process.
 - **Re-empowerment of the Armed Forces alongside the Islamist current:** Partial military decisiveness by the army leads to an authoritarian system protected by integrated Islamist networks.
 - **Comprehensive disintegration and chaos:** Fragmentation of authority, with warlords and tribal leaders carving out local fiefdoms under their control.
 - **Proxy regional escalation:** Sudan turns into an arena of direct military confrontation between Gulf states and the Horn of Africa.
 - **The Strategic Outlook of the “Youth Parliament” in the Second Term:**
 - **Vision and mission:** Completing the construction of a broad national civilian youth coalition with the qualitative capacity to produce public policy, monitor civic space, and place the concerns of youth, women and displaced people on the table of any peace or political-transition arrangements.
 - **Paths of institutional transformation:** Working across 6 strategic tracks (legitimacy and governance, representation of youth and women, protection and civic space, monitoring and early warning, public policy, and services and recovery).
 - **The Outcome and Ultimate Goal by September 2028:** Consolidating local and international recognition of the Youth Parliament- Sudan as a national, category-based coalition characterised by governance and transparency; strengthening confidence in its policy proposals and violations-monitoring outputs; positioning the Parliament as a platform bringing together broad representation of youth, women and displaced people across regions; and enabling it to play a pivotal and independent role in advancing democratic peace, transitional justice, and the genuine representation of civilian components in Sudan's future.

3| The Battlefield Situation and Military Balance:

2 Parallel / de-facto authorities Port Sudan east vs. Nyala west.	11 States under conflict strain Divided lines of control and supply.	3 Decisive attrition axes Khartoum, El Fasher, El Obeid.
---	--	--

3.1| Battlefield Developments and Conflict Drivers (October 2025 – August 2026):

- **The fall of El Fasher and its strategic consequences (October 2025):** The Rapid Support Forces' takeover of El Fasher marked a cornerstone in consolidating its near-complete grip on the Darfur region. The severe siege and the successive fall of vital areas produced a humanitarian catastrophe documented in the July 2026 reports of the International Fact-Finding Committee as “violations rising to crimes against humanity and genocide.”
- **The stalled Quad truce track and the Berlin principles:** The negotiation rounds in Geneva and Berlin during the first half of 2026 witnessed severe deadlock as a result of the Armed Forces' condition of a complete Rapid Support Forces withdrawal from civilian assets and urban areas, against the latter's insistence on recognition of the “Founding Alliance (Tasis)” in Nyala as a de-facto administrative authority.
- **Accountability and escalating sanctions:** The US Treasury and the European Union imposed an expanded package of targeted sanctions covering gold companies, banks, and logistics-supply lines linked to both parties to the conflict, complicating the flow of external military supplies and altering field-confrontation tactics.

The period between autumn 2025 and summer 2026 witnessed pivotal military shifts, as the war moved from direct confrontation to urban attrition warfare and intensive offensive-drone tactics.

— Tajalsir Onour, Head of the Parliament Council, 2024–2026

3.2| The Geographic Military Balance and the Map of Control Lines:

- **Areas controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied forces:**
 - **Geography:** The Armed Forces control the temporary administrative capital (Port Sudan), the eastern states (Red Sea, Kassala, Gedaref) and northern Sudan (the Northern State and River Nile), alongside regaining organisational control over most of the capital Khartoum and vital areas of Kordofan.
 - **Elements of strength:** Retaining international recognition, control of state institutions and fiscal sovereignty, and heavy reliance on air power and modern drones.
 - **Critical vulnerabilities:** Growing reliance on Popular Resistance battalions, armed movements that signed the peace agreement, and National Congress/Islamic Movement-linked battalions.
- **Areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces and the “Founding” government:**
 - **Geography:** The Rapid Support Forces control 4 entire states in Darfur, run their central administration from Nyala, and hold broad pockets in South and West Kordofan and the southern parts of Blue Nile.
 - **Elements of strength:** High mobility using four-wheel-drive vehicles, control of natural resources and mining routes, and light organisational flexibility.
 - **Critical vulnerabilities:** International diplomatic isolation, internal organisational fragmentation, and financial disruption due to sanctions and declining cross-border supply through Chad and neutral routes.

The prolongation of armed confrontations has entrenched a de-facto geographic and institutional division between two central authorities — Mustafa Bosh, Chair of the Representation and Elections Committee, 2024–2026

3.3| Critical Conflict Flashpoints and Urban Confrontations:

Flashpoint	Strategic Importance	Current Control Status	Humanitarian & Military Implications
El Obeid axis (North Kordofan)	The transport hub linking east and west and securing humanitarian supply.	Recurrent siege and intermittent attrition battles between the two sides.	A direct threat of collapsing food security and disrupted humanitarian supply chains.
El Fasher and Geneina axis (Darfur)	The historic administrative centre and the governing symbol of western Sudan.	Full RSF control with pockets of local resistance.	Record displacement rates, widespread rights violations, and halted health services.
The capital triangle (Khartoum–Bahri–Omdurman)	The state's political and economic centre and its decisive sovereign symbol.	The army has retaken large areas and set up joint checkpoints.	Comprehensive destruction of infrastructure, services and electricity.
Blue Nile and South Kordofan axis	Vital water, agricultural and border contact areas.	Three-way clashes involving the SPLM-North (al-Hilu).	A more complex alliance map, and stalled irrigation and food-security projects.

3.4| Military Constraints and the Determinants of Decisiveness:

- **The war of roads and drones:** The conflict has turned into precise, long-range strikes using drones, paralysing the movement of heavy military columns without giving infantry the ability to definitively hold urban points.
- **Funding scarcity and logistical exhaustion:** Sanctions, the destruction of financial assets, and the depletion of ammunition stocks have reduced the pace of comprehensive military operations, replacing them with cautious defence.
- **Social fragmentation and ethnic polarisation:** The war increasingly relies on civilian mobilisation and tribal call-ups, making it harder to impose any form of military control that secures the stability of affected areas without confronting extended local insurgency.

The nature of current fighting in the summer of 2026 imposes structural constraints that prevent either side from achieving a total or decisive military victory. — Diab Jabour, Chair of the Finance Committee, 2026–2028

4| International and Regional Actors:

3 Competing axes All nuclear-armed alliances.	4 States with direct involvement The US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE.	0 Binding points of convergence Absence of unified international will.
---	--	--

4.1| The Dominant Roles of Key Regional and International Powers:

- **The United Arab Emirates:** The most sensitive and influential actor in supporting Rapid Support Forces networks, through logistical and financial supply via cross-border lines and cover for illicit gold trade, aimed at protecting its economic influence in ports and resources and countering the rise of Islamist currents linked to the former regime.
- **The Arab Republic of Egypt:** Stands explicitly alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces and central state institutions, in order to safeguard its direct national-security depth and protect Nile-basin water security. Cairo provides diplomatic and intelligence support and border security, while leading parallel mediation efforts to avoid a partition scenario or the disintegration of military institutions.
- **The United States of America:** Leads the negotiating track within the “Quad Initiative,” focusing on humanitarian aid and reaching an enforceable “humanitarian truce.” Despite US Treasury sanctions imposed on leaders and companies on both sides, Washington is criticised for its hesitancy to use decisive pressure tools against the conflict’s regional sponsors.
- **The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:** Manages the negotiating file through the “Jeddah/Riyadh platform” in coordination with Washington, seeking to secure the Red Sea and limit security repercussions for Gulf security, while balancing open channels with both the army leadership and various regional components.

The map of external interventions in the Sudanese conflict is shaped by the intersection of conflicting strategic, security and economic interests, as the conflict’s duration has deepened regional alignments and direct and indirect support for both warring parties — Alfatih Alnour, Rapporteur and Chair of the Obstacles-Removal Committee before the Change Track, 2024–2026

4.2| Secondary Axes of Support and Parallel Tracks:

International/Regional Actor	Nature of Support and Involvement	Strategic Objective
Russia (and the Africa Corps/Wagner)	Supplying weapons to the army in exchange for agreement on a naval logistics hub, while maintaining mining-network relations with the Rapid Support Forces.	Securing a military foothold on the Red Sea and balancing Western influence in Africa.
Iran	Supplying the Armed Forces with advanced drones (such as Mohajer-6), reconnaissance technology and military technical support.	Restoring geopolitical influence in East Africa and securing a Red Sea corridor.
Turkey and Qatar	Providing humanitarian and development aid, diplomatic cover for the Port Sudan government, and facilitating non-lethal supplies.	Preserving relations with the central authorities and protecting historic investments.

Sudan has become an arena of competition among international and regional powers seeking to build a strategic foothold on the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa — Alaq Mohamed, Candidate for membership of the Special Committees, 2026–2028

4.3| Neighbouring States and Direct Regional Spillover:

- **The Republic of Chad:** The Chadian-Sudanese border represents the vital artery and field lifeline for military and logistical supply to the Rapid Support Forces, amid security fragility and rising fears in N'Djamena that the ethnic conflict in Darfur could spill over into Chad.
- **Libya (the eastern region – Haftar):** Forms a rear supply line of fuel, weapons and logistics for Rapid Support Forces vehicles via the border triangle, in coordination with parallel regional networks.

- **The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia:** Addis Ababa bases its position on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam file and the border dispute over al-Fashaqa, moving cautiously between providing space for civilian forces to operate and host their consultations, and maintaining balanced relations with the warring parties.

Sudan's immediate neighbours are heavily affected through displacement flows, tribal extensions, and overlapping security axes — Ahmed Farouk Moussa, Candidate for Chair of the Media Committee, 2026–2028

4.4| International Accountability Mechanisms and Multilateral Organisations:

- **The United Nations and alternatives to the “UNITAMS” mission:** The UN's current role is limited to the Secretary-General's Special Envoy and the oversight of humanitarian aid plans, alongside continuing investigations by the “Fact-Finding Mission,” which documented war crimes and crimes against humanity during the fall of El Fasher and Darfur's towns.
- **The African Union and IGAD:** Both back the “Quintet” track calling for comprehensive civilian dialogue and the suspension of Sudan's African Union membership, though divergent member-state positions and weak leverage hinder translating their decisions into a genuine truce.
- **The European Union:** Focuses on targeted economic sanctions and freezing the assets of companies and financial institutions linked to leaders of both sides, alongside funding cross-border humanitarian aid programs and supporting civil-society organisations.

International institutions seek to build frameworks for a solution and to protect civilians, yet their political paralysis limits their effectiveness on the ground — Mawadda Mohamed, Deputy Secretary-General, 2024–2026

5| The Architecture of Mediation and the Political Process:

3	8	0
Competing peace tracks Jeddah, the African Union, Port Sudan.	Failed rounds 5 military rounds, 3 political rounds.	Serious breakthroughs Crisis management only.

5.1| The Quad's Truce Track (Objectives and Methodology):

- **Focus on the humanitarian and military dimension:** This track's methodology relies on direct, separate negotiation with the military leaderships of both sides, aiming to impose a binding humanitarian truce, open secure corridors for aid delivery, and secure the parties' commitment to international humanitarian law.
- **The bottleneck of field mechanisms:** The Quad faces a major challenge in the absence of an independent field-monitoring mechanism on the ground to track violations, leading to the repeated collapse of initial understandings and results limited to short-lived, unsustainable truces.

The Quad track (comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt) leads the central international efforts to reach a ceasefire — Abdullah Qraidah, Chair of the Training and Studies Committee, 2024–2026

5.2| The Quintet's Civilian Track and Re-founding Tactics:

- **Vision for political transition:** This track insists that a military solution is untenable, and that any truce must be immediately paired with a comprehensive civilian political process leading to the formation of an independent transitional government of civilian expertise, free of armed parties.
- **Integrating social components:** The Quintet track seeks to broaden the base of participation to include emergency response rooms, grassroots coordination bodies, youth and women's organizations, and political blocs — addressing the shortcomings that marred previous political agreements.

The Quintet track (bringing together the African Union, IGAD, the Arab League, the European Union, and the United Nations) represents the broader political framework for a solution — Abdulhaleem Adam, Candidate for Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, 2026–2028

5.3| The Unilateral Internal Dialogue Offer (the Port Sudan Initiative):

- **Methodology and objectives:** The offer is based on holding a dialogue conference inside shared Sudanese territory under the umbrella of the existing executive and security apparatus, formally excluding the Rapid Support Forces and political forces allied with them (the term “allied forces” in the army's lexicon is invariably used to refer to the forces of the revolution as a form of political score-settling).
- **Civil and international position:** This offer was met with broad rejection from most independent civilian blocs and grassroots networks, including the Youth Parliament, as an attempt to tighten security control and bypass the requirements of democratic transition and the neutrality needed to manage the political process.

The Armed Forces leadership (through the Port Sudan government) put forward a futile track under the label of “internal Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue,” aimed at misleading domestic and international public opinion — Mohamed al-Bakheit, Director of the Political Representation Office, 2024–2026

5.4| Points of Conflict and Divergence Among the Competing Tracks:

Point of Divergence	The Quad Track	The Quintet Track	The Port Sudan Track
Process priorities	Ceasefire and security arrangements first.	Political process and civilian transition in parallel.	Legitimizing existing state institutions and excluding rivals.
Negotiating parties	Direct military components.	Civilian forces, civil society and youth.	Forces loyal to the military establishment and local networks.
The fate of the RSF	A party to signing the truce and field commitments.	A military entity to be dismantled and integrated into the transition.	A rebel group, classified as terrorist and politically excluded.
Backing and support	Direct international backing (Washington and Riyadh).	Multilateral regional and African legitimacy.	Domestic government support and sponsorship of the military establishment.

The architecture of mediation suffers from fragmentation and structural conflict among the various regional and international initiatives — Omar Shull, Chair of the Activities and Events Committee, 2024–2026

6| Map of Local Components and Actors:

4 Main local blocs The army, the RSF, Islamists, civilians.	+80% Emergency-room coverage The primary line of humanitarian defense.	1 Unified civilian coalition The Youth Parliament as a digital bridge.
--	---	---

6.1| The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Port Sudan Government:

- **Composition and alliances:** In its field and military posture, the Armed Forces rely on a complex alliance including Popular Resistance battalions, the Islamic Movement and the National Congress, armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement, and factions embedded with companies and administrative bodies.
- **Legitimacy and political vision:** The army leadership clings to the sovereign and executive legitimacy of the “Sovereignty Council,” rejecting any legal or political equivalence with the Rapid Support Forces, and expresses a vision centred on restoring security control and establishing a transitional order under the military apparatus's umbrella before entering any civilian electoral arrangements.

The Sudanese Armed Forces constitute the state's central military and institutional structure, exercising its claimed executive and sovereign authority from Port Sudan — Doaa Jaafar, Candidate for Chair of the Legal Committee, 2026–2028

6.2| The Rapid Support Forces and the “Founding” Council:

- **Structure and administrative control:** The Rapid Support Forces announced the formation of a “Founding Alliance (Tasis)” based in the city of Nyala to administer the affairs of the region and the states under its control, in an attempt to impose an administrative reality parallel to the Port Sudan government.
- **Structural challenges:** The Rapid Support Forces suffer from the fragmentation of unified command and control over field factions, international stigma over atrocities and ethnic violations in Darfur (especially following the fall of El Fasher), as well as escalating international sanctions targeting its financial networks and affiliated gold companies.

The Rapid Support Forces represent the opposing de-facto parallel military actor, having transformed from a paramilitary force into an administrative and field authority controlling wide swaths of the west and the “new south” — Abdelaziz al-Zein, Candidate for Chair of the Legal Committee, 2026–2028

6.3| Islamist Networks and Their Organisational and Field Influence:

- **Field influence and military backing:** Factions and battalions with Islamist backgrounds are active within the general mobilisation supporting the Armed Forces, giving them field weight and direct influence over decisive military decisions and rejection of negotiation initiatives that would return civilian forces to power.
- **Political strategy:** These networks seek to derail any peace agreement that would dismantle their political and economic empowerment, and work to support the unilateral internal-dialogue option under the military establishment's umbrella.

Islamist networks and leaders of the former National Congress regime continue to play a pivotal and influential role within the field and political reality — Jacob Bolis, Chair of the Academic and Religious Freedoms Committee, 2024–2026

6.4| Civilian Blocs and Political Forces:

- **The Declaration of Principles Coalition:** Brings together political parties and professional organisations calling for an end to the war and the establishment of an independent, democratic civilian track; it relies on diplomatic relations and international recognition within the Quintet track, but faces weak tools of direct field influence.
- **The Democratic Bloc and pro-army alliances:** Includes armed movements and political and communal forces that support the military establishment and reject external negotiating tracks that contribute to reviving the previous Framework Agreement.

The civilian political spectrum is marked by sharp division and strategic competition over legitimacy and the vision for managing the transition — Sawsan Jumaa, Chair of the Civic Participation Committee and supervisor of the Youth-Youth Dialogue Committee, 2024–2026

6.5| Armed Movements and Grassroots Networks:

Actor	Main Components	Strategic and Field Role
Main armed movements	The Sudan Liberation Movement (Minnawi), the Justice and Equality Movement (Jibril), the SPLM-North (al-Hilu)	Their roles range from explicit military alliance with the Armed Forces or the RSF to protect their regions, to adopting neutral positions and field manoeuvring in Kordofan and Blue Nile.
Emergency response rooms	Independent youth and grassroots networks spread across neighbourhoods and states.	Form the first line of humanitarian and field defence, providing food, medical services and direct relief to civilians amid the absence of the state, and repeatedly facing security targeting from the warring parties.
Youth, women's and rights networks	Protection initiatives, documentation networks, and grassroots rights groups.	Lead the monitoring and documentation of human-rights violations, support displaced women, and push the protection and transitional-justice agenda on peace platforms.

Armed movements play a diminished role in the conflict, while emergency response rooms and youth, women's and rights networks are the primary humanitarian actor directly on the ground — Mohamed Mutawalli, Candidate for Chair of the Political Participation Office, 2026–2028

7| The Humanitarian Situation and Baseline:

13.3M Total displaced and refugees 8.9M internal / 4.4M abroad.	60% Hospitals out of service Near-total collapse of the health sector.	20% Response-plan funding rate An 80% international funding gap.
---	--	--

7.1| Food-Insecurity Indicators and the Spread of Famine:

- **Phased food-security classification:** More than 19.5 million people (equivalent to 41% of the total population) face acute levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above).
- **Catastrophe and famine levels:** More than 135,000 people are in catastrophe/famine classification, particularly in besieged areas of the Darfur region (such as the vicinity of El Fasher and the Zamzam and Kalma camps) and specific areas of Khartoum and North Kordofan.

- **Areas threatened by full-scale famine:** UN and humanitarian assessments warn that 14 critical areas are under direct threat of full famine expansion before the end of the dry season, due to the blocking of aid convoys and customs imposed at military checkpoints.

By August 2026, Sudan's humanitarian crisis had reached unprecedented global levels in scale and depth, with food scarcity and the destruction of agricultural production turning into a direct weapon of war and a tool of siege against civilian communities — Mohamed Abdalla, Director of the Humanitarian Emergency Office, 2024–2026

7.2| The Displacement and Refugee Crisis and International Funding Challenges:

Indicator	Figures and Estimates	Field and Regional Implications
Internally displaced	8.9 million displaced.	The critical mass is concentrated in overcrowded schools and shelters in relatively safer eastern and northern states.
Cross-border refugees	4.4 million refugees.	Enormous pressure on host communities in neighbouring countries (Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda).
Humanitarian response-plan coverage	Only 20% of total funding required.	A severe deficit for international organisations in providing basic relief, medicine and emergency shelter.

By the second half of 2026, the Sudanese crisis represents the largest internal-displacement and refugee crisis in the world — Mulathmat Ismail, Candidate for Chair of the Education and Basic Services Office, 2026–2028

7.3| Destruction of Infrastructure, the Health Sector and Education:

- **The health sector and hospitals:** More than 40% of health facilities and hospitals have gone completely out of service due to direct bombardment, the lack of medical supplies, and disruptions to electricity and cold-chain storage for medicines.
- **Water and supply:** More than 17 million people lack access to safe drinking water, leading to outbreaks of cholera and tropical diseases in displacement camps and overcrowded areas.
- **Employment and Livelihoods:** The war has destroyed or disrupted economic facilities, markets, and sources of income, causing millions of people to lose their livelihoods and contributing to rising unemployment and precarious work.
- **Collapse of education and child protection:** The majority of schools and universities have closed their doors, and the educational process has been suspended for a third consecutive year, depriving millions of children and young people of their right to education and exposing them to forced recruitment, exploitation and acute malnutrition.

Service assets and the country's infrastructure have been subjected to systematic sabotage and near-total destruction, paralyzing civilian response capacity — Abdulhamid Talib, Director of the Education and Basic Services Office, 2024–2026

7.4| The Baseline of Grassroots Response Networks:

- **The role of emergency response rooms:** Manage central kitchens (“Takaya”), operate temporary medical centres, and secure civilian evacuation routes across conflict lines.
- **The demand for direct access:** These grassroots networks and youth organisations lack direct funding from international donors due to bureaucratic constraints and a preference for traditional

mechanisms, which requires adopting the Parliament's proposed “Basic Services” protocol and funding them directly to secure their continued field operation.

Despite the collapse of government institutions, grassroots networks have emerged as the sole backbone of services and survival — Eyhaa Siddeeg, Director of the Girls' Equity Office, 2024–2026

8| Scenarios for the Next 24 Months:

40%	25%	20%	10%	5%
Entrenched partition	Truce & transition	Army empowerment	Disintegration & chaos	Regional escalation

8.1| Methodological Framework and Strategic Drivers of Change:

- The scope of field contact and the military balance: the capacity for military decisiveness, or the freezing of front lines and the entrenchment of regional control.
- The shape and impact of external interventions: the level of regional-international alignment and the use of real leverage tools (weapons, sanctions, border closures).
- The degree of cohesion and influence of civilian components: the capacity of emergency rooms and coordination bodies, including the Youth Parliament, to impose a unified civilian agenda and sustain civic space.

Our strategic foresight for mapping scenarios for the years 2026–2028 relies on a matrix intersecting the crisis's core drivers — Mohamed Albadali, Candidate for Chair of the Training and Studies Committee, 2026–2028

8.2| Scenario (1): Entrenched De-Facto Partition

- **Probability:** 40% (the most likely scenario).
- **Nature of the dynamics:**
 - Continuation and consolidation of dual geographic control: the Port Sudan authority (the Armed Forces) in the east, north and centre, versus the Nyala authority (the RSF) and the “Founding (Tasis)” Alliance in Darfur and parts of Kordofan.
 - The main front lines turn into semi-fixed administrative borders, with attrition clashes and drone exchanges.
 - Growth of separate economic and financial networks (two currencies, two customs systems, and parallel cross-border trade lines).
- **Effects of the scenario on civic and youth space:**
 - Deepening social and institutional division, and the severance of service and financial links between the country's regions.
 - Rising security risks for civilian activists on charges of “trafficking” or “treason” and loyalty to the opposing side.
- **The required path for the “Youth Parliament”:**
 - Playing the role of the “national bridge”: unifying monitoring and service networks across administrative boundaries.
 - Focusing on documenting violations, preventing forced demographic change, and sustaining a unified civilian identity.

8.3| Scenario (2): A Negotiated Truce and a Contested Political Transition

- **Probability:** 25%
- **Nature of the dynamics:**

- Success of Quad and Quintet pressure in imposing a comprehensive humanitarian truce and a sustained ceasefire, backed by decisive international sanctions.
- Launch of a fragile transitional political process to form a civilian government of technocrats to manage the country's affairs, alongside integrating or arranging the status of the armed forces.
- Intense conflict over the legitimacy of civilian representation, regional quotas, and transitional justice.
- **Effects of the scenario on civic and youth space:**
 - Relative opening of civic space and the return of political and union initiatives to open activity.
 - Risks of civilian organisations being co-opted, and attempts by warlords and anti-democratic political blocs to court youth components.
- **The required path for the “Youth Parliament”:**
 - Seizing the opportunity for direct participation and imposing a “Youth and Women's Conditions Document” within transition arrangements.
 - Drafting ready-to-implement public-policy papers in rehabilitation, relief, transitional justice, recovery, and reconstruction.

8.4| Scenario (3): Re-Empowerment of the Armed Forces and the Tightening of Security Control

- **Probability:** 20%
- **Nature of the dynamics:**
 - The army achieves decisive military progress in Kordofan and the centre, and the RSF's movement and influence decline due to supply scarcity and international sanctions.
 - Formation of a crisis-management government in Khartoum and Port Sudan under the dominance of the security apparatus, fully backed by Islamist networks and popular resistance.
 - A tilted closure of political and civic space under the pretext of “rebuilding the state and combating insurgency.”
- **Effects of the scenario on civic and youth space:**
 - Severe restrictions on independent civic work and legal and security prosecution of independent actors.
 - Dominance of radical nationalist discourse and shrinking opportunities for non-aligned youth participation.
- **The required path for the “Youth Parliament”:**
 - Shifting to a cautious, independent operating model: defending basic freedoms and civil rights.
 - Focusing on local recovery services and rights monitoring through safe, encrypted channels.

8.5| Scenario (4): Comprehensive Disintegration and Regional Chaos

- **Probability:** 10%
- **Nature of the dynamics:**
 - Collapse of the central leaderships of both sides, splintering into militias and local warlords ruling specific areas.
 - Dominance of a “war of all against all” pattern, with a criminal economy, kidnapping, and forced levies prevailing.
 - Total cutoff of international aid, and catastrophic spread of famine and epidemics.
- **Effects of the scenario on civic and youth space:**
 - A direct threat to the lives of actors and activists, and the collapse of any capacity for normal institutional political work.
- **The required path for the “Youth Parliament”:**
 - Centering on “survival and relief”: converting structures into local mediation networks to protect individuals and facilitate emergency relief access.

8.6| Scenario (5): Direct Regional Escalation by Proxy

- **Probability:** 5%

- **Nature of the dynamics:**
 - Sudan turns into an arena of indirect or direct military confrontation between fully clashing regional axes.
 - A broad influx of advanced weaponry and foreign fighters across the Chadian, Libyan, and Red Sea borders.
- **The required path for the “Youth Parliament”:**
 - Intensive focus on international appeals, civilian protection, and activating advanced digital and personal-security protocols.

8.7| Scenarios and the Hoped-for Roles of the Youth Parliament:

Scenario	Political-Environment Features	Pivotal Role	Success Indicator
Entrenched partition	Two parallel authorities and frozen front lines.	The national digital bridge and defence of civilian identity.	Field and service linkage between the two authorities' regions.
Truce & transition	A political process and civilian opening.	Advancing the youth agenda and producing public policy.	Embedding youth demands in the constitutional document.
Military dominance	A security government and civic closure.	Protecting civic space and human rights.	Sustaining monitoring networks without security infiltration.
Disintegration & chaos	Collapse of authority and warlordism.	Local mediation and emergency relief.	Securing local humanitarian corridors and evacuating activists.
Regional escalation	Proxy confrontation and arms influx.	Appeals and humanitarian protection.	Carrying victims' voices to international forums.

9| The Strategic Framework for the Sudan Youth Parliament's “Second Term”:

5,000 Members in digital registry Institutionalizing 18 state-level parliaments.	24 Policy papers Knowledge production and field monitoring.	60% Women and displaced representation A core requirement for governance and legitimacy.
--	---	--

9.1| Methodological and Forward-Looking Framework for the New Electoral Term:

- The Youth Parliament's first term was established amid critical transitional conditions; the convening of the second electoral term (September 2026 – September 2028) coincides with a phase that requires accelerating the model of an “influential institutional civilian coalition.”
- This term's strategic methodology relies on evidence- and data-based field analysis and the organisational flexibility that allows the Parliament to adapt immediately to any of the 5 possible scenarios for the Sudanese crisis. At this stage, the Parliament serves as an independent platform for producing public policy, monitoring civic space, and protecting field actors, working toward placing

youth, women, and displaced people's issues and transitional justice on the table of any settlement or management arrangement for the coming phase.

9.2| Assessment of the Youth Parliament's Baseline and Institutional Assets:

- **Moral and field legitimacy:** Broad acceptance among grassroots networks, emergency response rooms, and women's and rights groups, given the Parliament's independent positions and its advocacy for civilian rights.
- **Weighting participation and reinforcing representation:** Classifying initiatives and networks into 3 levels (local, regional and national) and calculating membership on the Parliament's council equitably, while addressing any legitimacy gaps.
- **Geographic and network reach:** The extension of membership networks and links among youth and displaced people across the various states, neighbouring countries, and the diaspora.
- **Knowledge-production capacity:** Specialised cadres capable of drafting policy papers, strategic assessments, and transitional-justice and recovery literature.
- **Current constraints and gaps:** The need to institutionalise the digital membership registry, secure protection and digital-security mechanisms for volunteers, and ensure financial sustainability for the initiatives and networks that make up the Parliament, away from polarisation.

The Parliament enters its second term with accumulated institutional assets and field legitimacy that form the starting point for building its new strategy — Muawiya Mohamed Adam, Candidate for Deputy Secretary-General, 2026–2028

9.3| Strategic Windows of Opportunity and Areas for Intervention:

- **A policy vacuum in early recovery:** The inability of existing authorities to provide practical solutions to service crises gives the Parliament's policy papers a chance for direct adoption by donors and implementing organisations.
- **International demand for reliable monitoring and Partners:** Expand diplomatic outreach to transmit documented human rights violations and the voices of civil society actors directly to international policymakers, while strengthening international support for the Sudanese cause.
- **A search for new civilian legitimacy:** International tracks (such as the Quintet) seek new youth civilian forces capable of breaking the deadlock.
- **Solidarity and network building:** Growing agreement among emergency response rooms and women's and rights initiatives on the need for a unifying policy and rights-coordination platform.

Despite the political deadlock and the humanitarian catastrophe, Sudan's complex environment offers 4 key windows of opportunity that the Youth Parliament can leverage — Buraq Al-Basha, Candidate for membership of the Special Committees, 2026–2028

9.4| Vision, Mission, and Governing Principles:

- **Vision:**
 - A recognised and influential national civilian youth institution, leading the production of public policy, safeguarding civic space, and ensuring the effective and active representation of youth, women and displaced people in building a democratic and sustainable peace in Sudan by 2028.
- **Mission:**
 - Mobilising and organising youth and grassroots energies across Sudan and the diaspora through a flexible institutional structure, to produce practical policy solutions, monitor violations, protect civic space, and advocate for community issues in every decision-making forum and regional and international mediation process.
- **Governing principles:**
 - **Full independence:** An absolute refusal to be beholden to any party to the armed conflict or to any regional axis.

- **Equity and social justice:** A commitment to the fair representation of youth, women, displaced people and victims without ethnic or geographic discrimination.
- **Transparency and digital governance:** Adopting documented, democratic decision-making mechanisms and an encrypted, auditable membership registry.
- **Realism and practicality:** Centring on delivering workable field solutions and direct responses to local communities' needs.

9.5| Institutional Transformation (2026–2028):

- **Organisational build-out and expansion:**
 - **The registry:** Building the new structure on a secure, encrypted registry founded on robust information architecture, used to manage membership, conduct voting and remote engagement, and facilitate the participation of 5,000 active members by December 2026, with no less than 60% allocated to women and displaced people.
 - **Integration with field initiatives:** Absorbing at least 80% of emergency response rooms and women's and rights initiatives by March 2027 within the Parliament's structures, including through 18 state-level chapters (state youth parliaments).
- **Policy-making and international representation:**
 - **Research partnership and policy-paper transfer:** Opening the field for research institutions participating in the coalition to work on transferring and developing specialised public-policy papers designed for field application by August 2027.
 - **Early warning in cooperation with the Crisis Group:** Developing advanced tools in early warning and rapid response, and providing accurate and reliable data to support field and humanitarian interventions.
 - **Rights monitoring and documentation of violations:** Enabling the rights monitoring and documentation network (the Human Rights Forum) to produce at least 24 periodic reports to supply the data needed for transitional-justice mechanisms by June 2028.
 - **Civilian diplomacy and international representation:** Continuing current efforts and enabling the Parliament's civilian-diplomacy wings to participate independently in regional and international negotiation and mediation platforms (such as the Quintet track and African platforms) by December 2027.
- **Alliances and strategic tracks:**
 - **Partnership with the Sudanese Declaration of Principles forces:** Framing a civilian and political alliance with the Sudanese Declaration of Principles forces to build a civilian front committed to democratic civilian transformation, unifying visions on state rebuilding, and embedding youth and rights priorities in future political frameworks.
 - **Diplomatic engagement with the US State Department:** Expanding diplomatic engagement through a track with the US State Department to convey human-rights documentation reports and the voice of civilian actors directly to international decision-makers, and to strengthen international support for the Sudanese cause.
- **Risk management and funding:**
 - **Risk management:** The plan adopts established protocols and strict adherence to the bylaws, and activates field communication and relay networks, to avert security and operational risks in the field environment.
 - **Financial-support and transparency model:** The Parliament commits to not soliciting any direct funding or financial support for itself; instead, financial and logistical support is directed straight to the grassroots initiatives and networks carrying out field implementation — including funding for digital infrastructure, research, rights documentation, civilian diplomacy, and field operations — through a unified financial system subject to transparency and independent review.

10| References and Sources:

- Youth Parliament- Sudan, guided interviews and qualitative contributions with members of the Sudan Youth Parliament's Secretariat-General (2024–2026 term) and candidates for the General Secretariat offices and committees (2026–2028 term), August 2026, unpublished qualitative source.
- Youth Parliament- Sudan, “Profile: Definition, Structure, and Objectives.”
- Youth Parliament- Sudan, Bylaws Governing the Parliament's Work, approved by the Founding Committee, issued 20 September 2024.
- Youth Parliament- Sudan, “Statement: On the Establishment and Launch of the Human Rights Forum – Sudan, and Press Release: Appointment of an Official Spokesperson for the Human Rights Forum – Sudan,” 14 May 2026.
- Human Rights Forum – Sudan, “Statement on the Joint Banjul Declaration and Activating Governance and Accountability Frameworks,” 14 May 2026.
- Youth Parliament- Sudan, Human Rights Forum – Sudan, Public Policy Institute – Sudan, “Technical Reference Document: A Civil-Society-Led, Evidence-Based Assessment of Parallel Financial Networks and Sudan's War Economy,” 26 May 2026.
- Youth Parliament- Sudan, “Brief: Sudan Through the Eyes of Youth– Transitioning from Militia and War Rule to a State of Institutions and Development,” 14 February 2026.
- Human Rights Forum – Sudan, “Statement: Condemning the Dangerous Escalation in the Use of Drones Against Civilians,” 15 May 2026.
- Human Rights Forum – Sudan, “Press Release: Sudan Faces a Worsening Health Crisis Amid Rising Mpox Cases in Darfur,” 17 May 2026.
- Youth Parliament- Sudan, “Memorandum of Girls and Women – Kiryandongo Refugee Camp (Uganda),” 2 July 2026.
- Youth Parliament- Sudan, “Brief on the Status of Youth in Sudan: A Story of Resilience and the Will to Build,” 15 August 2025.
- Youth Parliament- Sudan, “Statement Welcoming the Outcomes of the Second Meeting of the Sudanese Declaration of Principles Forces,” May 2026.
- Radio Dabanga, “Haavisto Concludes Intensive Consultations in Kampala to Advance Peace in Sudan,” 23 July 2026.
- Radio Dabanga, “Youth Demand a Comprehensive Dialogue Addressing the War's Root Causes and Placing Justice and Peace First,” 15 August 2026.
- United Nations (Geneva), “Sudan: Appointment of a New Personal Envoy for the Secretary-General,” 24 February 2026.
- Al Jazeera Net, “Sudan Approves Haavisto as New UN Envoy,” 23 March 2026.
- Sudanese Declaration of Principles Forces, “Closing Statement of the Second Meeting: Toward Building a New Nation,” Nairobi, 22–23 May 2026.
- Sudanese Declaration of Principles Forces, “Statement on the Quintet Mechanism's Invitation to a Consultative Meeting to Prepare for the Political Process,” 28 July 2026.
- Al Jazeera Net, “al-Burhan Pledges Immunity for Dialogue Participants and Rejects Hemedti's Return to Power,” 15 August 2026.
- Al Jazeera Net, “al-Burhan's Dialogue: Will It End the War or Entrench the Reality of Division?” news analysis, 18 August 2026.
- News reports and analytical coverage from: Reuters, Al Jazeera, Amnesty International, and regional and international strategic-analysis centres.
- Official statements and briefings issued by: the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, the UN Security Council, and the US State Department.
- Field data and reports issued by: the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), the International Organisation for Migration, and Save the Children.